Wireless Technologies and the National Information Infrastructure.
Chapter 11 - Health Issues:
The Controversy Surrounding Health Effects

The debate over the possible health effects from the radio waves used by cellular telephone and other mobile communications systems is intensely polarized. On one side, some citizens and a few researchers are firmly convinced that such radio waves pose a substantial health risk to public health. They believe that cellular phones should be redesigned or banned and that construction of new radio transmitters and antennas, especially those needed for cellular and future personal communications services (PCS) systems, should be restricted and perhaps even stopped. (Radio interference with medical devices such as pacemakers is addressed in chapter 12.) On the other side, equipment manufacturers and service providers maintain that there is no credible evidence that their products and services threaten human health. Without clear and definitive proof of harm, they argue that the development of new systems (and expansion of existing systems) should continue. Both sides have evidence--scientific studies, statistical records, and anecdotal reports--they believe supports their case. The result is a confusing and often conflicting body of scientific and medical literature.

In disputes like this, identifying and evaluating risk to the public is often difficult. Many elements contribute to understanding risk, and often these are confused, misinterpreted, or misrepresented. In many cases, the elements become divisive public policy issues as different groups with different perspectives battle over what is legitimate, acceptable, and "true," and what is not. In situations where individuals cannot avoid exposure--as in the case of radio waves--it is the role of government through the regulatory and policy process to decide what level of risk is acceptable and to enact the necessary provisions to protect public health. To focus government resources and policy efforts most effectively, it is important for policymakers and regulators to understand the different stages involved in evaluating this risk.

The first step in assessing this type of risk is establishing causality--what effects are due to what causes, and how certain is the relationship between them. Disputes can arise between different parties claiming that effects are or are not associated with particular causes, and disagreements frequently center on the adequacy of the science that supports a particular position. This is true with radio wave radiation and its effects on animal tissues. High-power microwave radiation, for example, is known to produce thermal effects (heating), but the possible nonthermal effects of radio waves, which include changes in cell membrane permeability, cell metabolism, or on genetic material, are more contentious. A few researchers have found some such effects, but results are still considered tentative, and the mechanisms causing them are not well understood.

The second element in assessing risk is demonstrating harm from the effects. Even if a cause and an effect can be positively linked, this does not necessarily mean that harm results. Making this connection is at the heart of current debates over the safety of radio communication systems. In the case of radio waves' effects on animal tissues, this means that any observed biological effects need to be clearly linked to observed health problems. Heating effects have been shown to cause adverse health reactions, but not at the low power levels used by today's cellular telephones. Determining harm is more difficult with nonthermal effects-- which might affect basic cell functions that are only now beginning to be understood--and will be the subject of long debate.

In any case, some people will view any biological effects as harmful, whether or not there are any actual impacts on health. Fundamentally, an assessment of risk and one's reaction to it is quite subjective and personal. For example, many people are afraid to fly, although airline fatalities are rare. On the other hand, automobile safety receives far less public scrutiny, even though tens of thousands die annually from highway accidents.

In trying to evaluate the possible harm from radio communication systems, different groups disagree over what standards of proof should be used to determine safety or harm--that is, what proof is adequate to prove or disprove potential adverse health effects. One view requires proof of no harm before a technology is deployed. This approach is generally taken, for example, by the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration: firms must show, through extensive self-funded testing, that a new drug has few significant known adverse effects when used as prescribed.

An alternative approach is to permit a technology to be deployed, under certain guidelines, until it can be shown convincingly that negative effects result, or no proof of harm (note word order difference from above). In this case, experimentation is not limited to test groups in experimental settings, but also takes place among the public where a technology can be fully and vigorously evaluated in real-world conditions. For example, software producers expect bugs in early releases of their products because they know they cannot completely test programs and applications on their own beforehand. (see footnote 4)

Most technologies fall somewhere between these two positions: initial experimentation is extremely limited in scale and scope, often confined solely to the laboratory. Next, the technology or product is subjected to more rigorous evaluation to see if hazards exist. After a period of controlled testing and evaluation, standards may be issued by the relevant technical body, such as the Institute of Electric and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). These standards may be accepted by government regulators, and become enshrined as substantial benchmarks guiding general and large-scale use and deployment of the technology or product.

If new information about hazards or other negative effects later comes to light, the standard may be changed with the agreement of the standards bodies and regulators. Changes at this stage may be difficult due to the institutional interests surrounding the status quo and the changing standard of proof required to attend to problems. With technologies or products such as asbestos, lead paint, or tobacco that come to be seen as hazardous, the firms that manufacture them have, in many cases, successfully resisted efforts to label them as bad for health, despite steadily mounting evidence to the contrary.

Another issue in determining harm is the integrity of the process by which research is conducted, including that of the people performing the work. If research is conducted in a way that raises questions of bias or poor quality, then such work will fail to settle questions about cause and effect, as well as potential hazards. Charges of bias, ignoring contrary evidence, or slipshod research methods may be unfounded, but nevertheless must be taken seriously. Failure to demonstrate good faith or adherence to good scientific practice in the process by which information is gathered and evaluated may lead to continuing controversy. The makeup of research teams, lack of financial or other ties to firms with a stake in the outcome, fair and open evaluation of research proposals and research results, open publication of results or other public reporting requirements, participation by all interested parties, regardless of their affiliation--all these contribute to the integrity of the research process. These factors are also essential to reducing public concerns about research bias, and to increasing public trust and confidence in the technologies or products in question.

In the face of inconclusive and ambiguous evidence, different groups have different reactions. Opponents of widespread deployment of cellular and PCS facilities, and those claiming that cellular telephones promote cancer, argue that the industry should be held to the "proof of no harm" test. Without convincing proof of their safety, some people believe that antennas and towers should be restricted or moved and phones should be redesigned or prohibited altogether, even those that conform to current safety guidelines. The wireless industry, on the other hand, argues that there has been no proof of harm to date, and that changes in standards and use of the technologies should occur only when substantial and persuasive proof of harm is demonstrated. The industry also argues that it is funding research into biological and health effects, and that this research will help settle disputes about the safety of microwave radio frequency technologies. Compromise between these two groups will be very difficult, because their reactions to uncertainty are based on diametrically opposed philosophies--stop until safety is guaranteed or keep going until harm is proven--and both hold up different standards of proof.

Faced with a technical and policy controversy such as this, policymakers have difficult choices to make. If a technology is already being widely used, as is the case with many wireless technologies, using a "proof of no harm" standard is unrealistic. Television broadcasting towers, public safety radios, cellular towers and antennas, and hand-held cellular telephones have been deployed for years, and are used by tens of millions of people. Stopping these systems until definitive testing can be done is not realistic in today's political climate. However, finding out about possible harm through monitoring and active research is a viable option. Identifying early indications of effects or harm is in the public interest, even if short-term costs are high. Research to determine cause-and-effect relationships, and to ascertain the extent to which and under what circumstances harm may ensue, is essential. Some researchers also suggest that those concerned about possible hazards from electromagnetic radiation practice "prudent avoidance," which is avoidance of emissions where it is economically, operationally or physically easy to do so. (see footnote 5)